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This article analyzes whether international tribunals can find 
Multilateral Development Banks (“MDBs”) liable for human rights 
violations that occur in developing countries as a result of projects 
financed by these MDBs. It seeks to address the gap under 
international law concerning direct responsibility of MDBs, as well 
as to provide legal approaches for the progressive development of an 
applicable international legal framework. It is not within the scope of 
this article to analyze legal approaches towards: state responsibility 
for MDBs’ wrongful acts before international tribunals;1 human 
rights responsibility before political bodies;2 or direct responsibility 
of MDBs before domestic courts.3 
Part I briefly addresses the meaning of the term “Multilateral 
Development Banks” since international law does not define it. Part 
II identifies the general rules concerning legal personality under 
international law. In particular, it develops legal approaches 
pertaining to the personality of MDBs. Part III discusses the existing 
 
 1. See generally August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal 
Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors, in NON-STATES ACTORS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 78-82 (Philip Alston ed. 2005) (analyzing the issue of state 
responsibility for non-state activities as a means to protect human rights violated 
by those activities). 
 2. See, e.g., U.N. H.R. Comm. as established by Article 28 of the Int’l 
Covenant on Civil and Pol. Rts.; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts. as 
determined by the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Res. 1985/17 (28 May 
1985). 
 3. See generally Reinisch, supra note 1, at 87-89 (discussing the part that 
domestic courts play in enforcing human rights as against non-state actors). 
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rules of international law concerning responsibility, as well as legal 
approaches regarding ways to attribute responsibility to MDBs when 
they cause wrongful acts.  
Part IV focuses on the approaches developed by MDBs regarding 
human rights protection. MDBs have established operational policies 
regarding particular themes in order to underline safeguard measures. 
They have also created internal inspection mechanisms as a means to 
assure their compliance with those operational policies because of 
human rights concerns. In this regard, the notion of an effective 
remedy under international human rights law will play a critical role 
in determining the ineffectiveness of MDBs’ approaches from a 
human rights viewpoint. Part V concludes that a gap exists in 
international law because there is no mechanism for holding MDBs 
responsible for human rights violations that have occurred as a result 
of projects that they financed.  
I.  DEFINING MDBS 
MDBs are international organizations created by states or regions, 
and charged with fostering economic and social development, either 
in the public or private sector.4 In this regard, they constitute a 
particular category of International Financial Institutions (“IFIs”). 
The most influential MDBs operating in developing countries 
throughout the Americas are the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”) (which is part of the 
World Bank),5 the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”),6 and 
the Inter-American Development Bank (“IADB”).7 
MDBs arise out of state-created constituent instruments often 
referred to as Articles of Agreement.8 MDBs’ Articles of 
 
 4. See, e.g., World Bank, Multilateral Development Banks, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040614~menuPK:41699~pageP
K:43912~piPK:44037~theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) 
(listing four regional development banks and explaining that both developed and 
developing countries may be members of the development banks). 
 5. World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
 6. International Financial Corporation [IFC], http://www.ifc.org (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2010). 
 7. Inter-American Development Bank [IADB], http://www.iadb.org (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
 8. See, e.g., World Bank, Articles of Agreement, 
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Agreements are ‘treaties’ per the legal meaning given to that term as 
reflected in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) of 1969.9 The majority of the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention represent the codification of 
pre-existing rules of customary international law, but some 
provisions also reflect a progressive development of the law.10 
According to Article 5, the Vienna Convention applies to MDBs’ 
Articles of Agreements because they are treaties constituting 
international organizations.11 
States act collectively through the MDB structure. As multilateral 
institutions, MDBs are exclusively comprised of and governed by 
states.12 Their membership is open only to states, although 
membership is not restricted to those states that create a specific 
MDB. For instance, according to the IADB’s Articles of Agreement, 
the original members are members of the Organization of American 
States (“OAS”), but the membership is also open to non-regional 
countries that are members of the International Monetary Fund if 





ePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html (last visited Mar. 30, 
2010) (providing the organizational framework for each group). 
 9. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“For the 
purposes of the present Convention: (a) ‘treaty’ means an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation.”). 
 10. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 580 (6th ed. 
2003). 
 11. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 5 (“The present Convention 
applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international 
organization and to any treaty adopted within an international organization without 
prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization.”). 
 12. See Robert T. Coulter, Leonardo A. Crippa & Emily Wann, Principles of 
International Law for Multilateral Development Banks: The Obligation to Respect 
Human Rights 8 & n. 22 (Indian Law Resource Ctr., Washington, D.C., 2009), 
available at http://www.dar.org.pe/documentos/cartas/2009-
01%20Principles%20Memo%20FINAL%20ENG.pdf. 
 13. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank (IADB), Agreement Establishing the Inter-American 
Development Bank art. II, § 1, Apr. 8, 1959, 10 U.S.T. 3029, 389 U.N.T.S. 69 
[hereinafter IADB Establishing Agreement]. 
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MDBs decision-making organs are comprised of representatives 
from each MDB member state. For instance, according to the 
IADB’s Articles of Agreement, all the power of the Bank is vested in 
the Board of Governors, which can delegate functions to the Board 
of Executive Directors.14 Each of these organs is exclusively made up 
of representatives of member states.15 A member state’s voting rights 
in the decision-making organs depend on how much the country is 
contributing to the Bank’s capital stock.16 
MDBs work toward the economic and social development of 
developing member countries, and universal MDBs, like those within 
the World Bank, operate in developing member countries around the 
world.17 Regional MDBs operate in specific regions of the world,18 
such as the IADB in Latin-American developing countries. 
According to the IADB’s Articles of Agreement, the Bank’s purpose 
is to contribute to the development of the regional developing 
member countries, individually and collectively.19 
Finally, MDBs execute their mandates by focusing on the public 
and/or private sector. On one hand, the IADB and the World Bank 
 
 14. See id. art. VIII, § 2 (prohibiting the Board of Governors from delegating 
certain tasks to the Board of Executive Directors, including the powers “to admit 
new members” and “authorize the conclusion of general agreements for 
cooperation with other international organizations”). 
 15. See id. art. VIII, § 3 (requiring that the executive directors “be persons of 
recognized competence and wide experience in economic and financial matters but 
. . . not be governors”). 
 16. JOHN RUTHRAUFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD BANK, INTER-
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 6 
(Elizabeth Zechmeister ed., 1997). 
 17. See, e.g., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles 
of Agreement art. 1, Feb.  16, 1989, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-
articlesofagreement.pdf [hereinafter IBRD Articles of Agreement] (“The purposes 
of the Bank are: (i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of 
members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, 
including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the 
reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of 
the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed 
countries.”) 
 18. Regional MDBs include the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 
the African Development Bank. 
 19. IADB Establishing Agreement, supra note 13, art. I, § 1. 
CRIPPA_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  5:20 PM 
536 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:531 
mainly carry out their operations and projects in the public sector,20 
provided that their purposes are to accelerate the development of 
developing member countries. On the other hand, the IFC focuses 
exclusively on private enterprises located in member countries.21 
II. INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY 
Whether MDBs can be held liable for the international human 
rights violations of their financed projects depends on whether they 
fit into the existing liability rules under international law. These rules 
apply to legal personalities. This Part considers whether MDBs 
possess legal personality under international law. 
A.  SUBJECTS OF LAW 
An entity has a legal international personality, in an original or 
derivative fashion, when legal rights and obligations under 
international law apply to that entity. Without question, states are the 
original subjects of international law, as they are the foundation of 
the international legal framework. A state’s international personality 
is not only original but also necessary for the international legal 
system because the creation of other subjects of international law 
depends on states’ consent,22 among other factors. For that reason, 
other subjects of law—that is, other entities to which international 
law applies—possess a derivative legal international personality.23 
 
 20. See generally id. art. I, § 1; IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, 
art. I. 
 21. See Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation art. 1, 
May 25, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter IFC Articles of 
Agreement] (“The purpose of the Corporation is to further economic development 
by encouraging the growth of productive private enterprises in member countries, 
particularly in the less developed areas, thus supplementing the activities of the 
[IBRD] . . . .”). 
 22. MONCAYO VINUESA GUTIÉRREZ POSSE, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 
PÚBLICO (PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW) 15-16 (Zavalía ed. 1999). 
 23. See id. (explaining that states have original personality and that the legal 
personality of international organizations is derived from the purpose for which 
states created them); see also Sascha Rolf Lüder, The Legal Nature of the 
International Criminal Court and the Emergence of Supranational Elements in 
International Criminal Justice, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 79, 80 (2002), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/59KDCL/$File/079-
092_Luder.pdf (asserting that states have international organizations derive their 
personality from the states that created them). 
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Scholars have identified several elements as crucial to determining 
legal personality under international law. These elements are: (1) the 
“capacity to make claims in respect to breaches of international law”; 
(2) the “capacity to make treaties and agreements valid on the 
international plane”; and (3) the “enjoyment of privileges and 
immunities from national jurisdictions.”24  
1.  Public International Law 
In public international law there is an on-going debate about who 
are the proper subjects of international law. On the one hand, there is 
an outlook that suggests that only states have an international 
personality. On the other hand, there is a broader viewpoint that 
advocates for a more comprehensive approach and supports the idea 
that, apart from states, there are other entities with international legal 
personalities. Under the latter view, there are certain entities that 
might be considered subjects of international law, such as 
individuals, non-self-governing peoples, and belligerent and 
insurgent communities.25 A growing consensus—evidenced by the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), various 
Vienna Conventions, and a developing public international law 
treaty—asserts that international organizations are subjects of 
international law.  
First, the ICJ has treated the United Nations as a subject of 
international law. In the Reparations advisory opinion of 1949, the 
Court stated that the United Nations “was intended to exercise and 
enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights 
which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large 
measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon 
an international plane.”26 Since that opinion, the debate about the 
 
 24. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 57; see also Menno T. Kamminga, The 
Evolving Status of NGOs Under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State 
System?, in NON-STATES ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 93, 94-95 
(Philip Alston ed. 2005) (applying a slight modification of Brownlie’s approach in 
order to analyze to the status of NGOs under international law). 
 25. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 483 (June 27) (stating 
that states parties to treaties can commence international proceedings on behalf of 
their nationals); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 57-67 (suggesting different 
entities that have international legal personalities). 
 26. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter U.N. Service 
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legal personality of international organizations has evolved 
considerably. Indeed, thirty years later, in the 1980 WHO opinion, 
the Court established that “[i]nternational organizations are subjects 
of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations 
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under 
their constitutions or under international agreements to which they 
are parties.”27 
Second, the Vienna Convention refers to international 
organizations. Article 5 states that the “Convention applies to any 
treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international 
organization and to any treaty adopted within an international 
organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the 
organization.”28 Article 2(1)(i) provides that “[f]or the purposes of 
the present Convention: . . . ‘international organization’ means an 
intergovernmental organization.”29 Three other Vienna conventions 
use the same legal definition and take the same approach: the Vienna 
Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with 
International Organizations of a Universal Character,30 the Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,31 and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or Between International 
Organizations.32 
Finally, a developing treaty is also adopting the same position with 
regard to the legal personality of international organizations. The 
International Law Commission (“ILC”), responsible for elaborating 
the Draft Convention on Responsibility of International 
 
Reparations]. 
 27. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and 
Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-90 (Dec. 20). 
 28. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 5. 
 29. Id. art. 2(1)(i). 
 30. Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with 
International Organizations of a Universal Character art. 1(1)(1), Mar. 14, 1975, 11 
I.L.M. 499 (not yet in force). 
 31. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 
2(1)(n), Aug. 23, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488. 
 32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and 
International Organizations or Between International Organizations art. 2(1)(i), 
Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 (“1. For the purposes of the present Convention: . . . 
“(i) ‘international organization’ means an intergovernmental organization . . . .”). 
CRIPPA_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  5:20 PM 
2010] MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 539 
Organizations, has defined international organizations under Article 
2 as “an organization established by a treaty or other instrument 
governed by international law and possessing its own international 
legal personality. International organizations may include as 
members, in addition to States, other entities.”33 
2.  International Human Rights Law 
There are two subjects of law clearly identified under the 
governing rules of international human rights law:34 the states parties 
and individuals. On one hand, states parties of human rights treaties 
are subjects of the law. They have been embodied with a passive 
personality, provided that they have assumed obligations towards the 
protection of the fundamental rights of those individuals who are 
subject to their jurisdiction. Regional human rights treaties clearly 
determine such personality, including the American Convention on 
Human Rights (“American Convention”), the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(“European Convention”), and the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”).35 
 
 33. U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations: Titles 
and Texts of the Draft Articles 1, 2 and 3 Adopted by the Drafting Committee, art. 
2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.632 (June 4, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, 
Draft Articles 1, 2 and 3]. 
 34. See generally Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 45, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter 
African Charter]; OAU, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
art. 3, July 11, 2003, available at 
http://www.achpr.org/english/women/protocolwomen.pdf [hereinafter Protocol to 
African Charter]; Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 32, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221 
[hereinafter European Convention]; Organization of American States (OAS), 
American Convention on Human Rights arts. 41, 44, 45, 62.3, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]. 
 35. See American Convention, supra note 34, art. 1 (assuming an obligation “to 
respect the rights and freedoms” under the American Convention, and to refrain 
from discrimination); European Convention, supra note 34, art. 1 (“The High 
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”); African Charter, supra note 
34, art. 1 (“The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the 
present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this 
Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to 
them.”). By assuming obligations to protect such rights, each convention gives its 
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On the other hand, individuals and groups have also been granted 
international personality. They possess an active personality since 
the above-mentioned Conventions entitle them to certain human 
rights. But their capacity is limited to the possibility of submitting 
claims against states parties, not against other entities.36 They do not 
possess the capacity to make claims regarding breaches of rules 
concerning anything other than international human rights law, nor 
do they possess the capacity to make treaties and agreements valid 
on the international plane. Instead, they must submit their claims to 
the individual complaint procedure mechanisms before human rights 
treaty-bodies, and through which they can make only friendly 
settlements with the offending states.37 Finally, neither individuals 
nor groups enjoy privileges and immunities from national 
jurisdictions. 
The foundational rule suggests that only states, as subjects of 
international law, have a passive personality. As a result, only states 
can be found responsible for human rights violations based on non-
compliance with assumed human rights obligations. The main human 
rights treaties—the actual legal basis for the regional systems—are 
all based on this legal perspective.  
 
respective states parties passive personality. 
 36. Regional human rights treaties clearly establish such capacity. See, e.g., 
American Convention, supra note 34, art. 44 (“Any person or group of persons, or 
any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of 
the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party.”); 
European Convention, supra note 34, art. 34 (“The Court may receive applications 
from any person, non-governmental organisation [sic] or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of 
the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High 
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of 
this right.”); African Charter, supra note 34, art. 55(1) (“Before each Session, the 
Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the Communications other than 
those of States Parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the members of 
the Commission, who shall indicate which Communications should be considered 
by the Commission.”). 
 37. See American Convention, supra note 34, art. 48(1)(f) (“When the 
Commission receives a petition or communication alleging violation of any of the 
rights protected by this Convention, it shall proceed as follows: . . . The 
Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view 
to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for the human 
rights recognized in this Convention.”). 
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B.  MDBS AS SUBJECTS OF LAW 
On the international plane, there is neither a legal definition for 
MDBs nor a legal approach with which to understand their 
international personality, or more specifically, their passive 
personality under international human rights law. Consequently, 
these issues will be analyzed in light of the existing approaches and 
definitions concerning international intergovernmental organizations. 
This analysis will provide a framework for addressing MDBs as 
international organizations. 
The following questions, as pointed out earlier, should be 
answered in a positive fashion in order to assert MDBs’ legal 
personality: (1) whether their constituent instruments are governed 
by international law; (2) whether they can make claims regarding 
breaches of international law; (3) whether they can celebrate treaties 
and agreements valid on the international plane; and (4) whether they 
enjoy privileges and immunities from national jurisdictions. 
First, MDBs’ constituent instruments are governed by 
international law. According to Article 5 of the Vienna Convention, 
MDBs’ Articles of Agreements are governed by the Vienna 
Convention since they are treaties constituting international 
organizations. Moreover, the interpretation of the constituent 
instruments as treaties are governed by the rules of interpretation 
reflected in the Vienna Convention.38 
Second, MDBs do have the capacity to make claims in respect of 
breaches of international law. Generally speaking, according to the 
Reparations opinion issued by the ICJ, international organizations 
such as the United Nations have the capacity to bring an international 
claim against a state (whether a member or non-member) for 
damages resulting from that state’s breach of its obligations towards 
the Organization.39 In accordance with growing opinion, the 
“capacity to espouse [international] claims thus depends (1) on the 
existence of legal personality and (2) on the interpretation of the 
constituent instrument in the light of the purposes and functions of 
 
 38. See MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHTS AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
116-22 (2003) (citing Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention as the 
“fundamental rules of interpretation”). 
 39. U.N. Service Reparations, supra note 26. 
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the particular organization.”40 It is clear that MDBs, as international 
organizations, do possess an international legal personality. 
Therefore, the discussion leans towards the interpretation of MDBs’ 
constituent instruments in light of their purposes and functions. In 
this regard, the governing rules embodied in Articles 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention play a critical role since they were 
“developed through centuries of state practice, judicial precedents 
and scholarly work.”41 Additionally, it is important to scrutinize the 
designs and purposes of the constituent instruments of MDBs.42 It is 
natural to conclude that, by virtue of their legal personality and the 
purposes and functions of their Articles of Agreement, MDBs are 
capable of bringing claims regarding breaches of international law. 
Third, MDBs also have the capacity to make treaties and 
agreements valid at the international level. The treaty-making power 
of an international organization depends on the terms of their 
constituent instrument.43 Articles of Agreement do not prevent 
MDBs from entering into international treaties and agreements. 
Indeed, some MDBs have already entered into agreements with other 
international organizations. For instance, the World Bank has a 
Relationship Agreement with the U.N. Economic and Social Council 
(“ECOSOC”).44  
Finally, MDBs enjoy privileges and immunities from national 
jurisdictions. Privileges and immunities are recognized in customary 
international law; however, according to legal authorities, “there is as 
yet no general agreement on the precise content of the customary law 
concerning the immunities of international organizations.”45 
Apparently, agents of “international organizations are immune from 
legal process in respect of all acts performed in their official 
capacity.”46 However, with regard to MDBs and according to their 
 
 40. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 654. 
 41. DARROW, supra note 38, at 120 & n.37. 
 42. Id. at 121. 
 43. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 651. 
 44. DARROW, supra note 38, at 124. While the World Bank and ECOSOC 
work together, the two organizations carefully delineate the “scope for 
cooperation” under the agreement. Id. 
 45. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 652. 
 46. Id. (remarking that the degree to which agents enjoy immunity differs, and 
that courts address their immunity by referring to principles of diplomatic 
immunity, or from principles relating to the functions that the agents carry out for 
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corresponding Articles of Agreement, their agents do enjoy 
privileges and immunities within the territory of each member state.47 
Moreover, the privileges and immunities in question refer to 
immunity from legal processes in the context of agents acting in their 
official capacity.48 
1.  MDBs Are International Intergovernmental Organizations 
MDBs are international intergovernmental organizations since 
they are comprised of and governed by member states. As stated in 
Part I, MDBs are created by the consensus of states, and they are 
governed by the collective decisions adopted by the decision-making 
organs exclusively comprised of member states’ representatives. 
Moreover, MDBs themselves expressly regulate their “relations with 
other organizations” under their Articles of Agreement.49 
States act collectively as international organizations through 
MDBs. Indeed, MDBs are acting as “surrogates” for states in some 
of their activities because the states are their “lords and masters.”50 In 
addition, because MDBs are international organizations that possess 
a legal personality independent from their member states, the states 
can collectively carry out acts based on MDBs’ constituent 
instruments and mandates. Accordingly, while recognizing the 
international personality of the United Nations, an international 
organization, the ICJ concluded in the Reparations opinion that the 
 
their respective organizations). 
 47. See, e.g., IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. VII, § 1 (“To 
enable the Bank to fulfill the functions with which it is entrusted, the status, 
immunities and privileges set forth in this Article shall be accorded to the Bank in 
the territories of each member.”). 
 48. See id. art. VII, § 8(i) (granting immunity to “[a]ll governors, executive 
directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank” for official acts, absent 
explicit waivers of that immunity). 
 49. See, e.g., IADB Establishing Agreement, supra note 13, art. XIV, § 2 
(allowing the Bank to regulate the flow of information between itself and other 
organizations); see also IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. V, § 8 
(“Relationship to Other International Organizations”); IFC Articles of Agreement, 
supra note 21, art. IV, § 7 (“Relations with other International Organizations”). 
 50. See Philip Alston, The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International 
Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATES ACTORS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 3, 29. 
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United Nations has “a large measure of international personality and 
the capacity to operate upon an international plane.”51 
2.  MDBs Are not Non-State Actors 
Although there is no legal definition of the term ‘non-state actor’ 
under international law, MDBs should not be considered as such 
since they are international organizations through which states act 
collectively. For some scholars, the term ‘non-state actor’ refers to 
armed opposition groups in a domestic context that act independent 
of states, such as rebel groups, irregular armed groups, insurgents, 
dissident armed forces, guerrillas, and liberation movements.52 For 
others, ‘non-state actors’ are all the actors—aside from state 
agents—”that operate at the international level and are potentially 
relevant to international relations.”53 Finally, a third position 
considers ‘non-state actors’ as those affected people “who have no 
contractual relationship with [MDBs] but whose living conditions are 
directly or indirectly affected by the bank-financed operation.”54 
Based on these various positions, there is neither a clear definition 
nor uniform use of the term non-state actor by legal authorities. 
Whatever the prevailing definition that international law may 
follow, MDBs should not be considered ‘non-state actors’. As 
asserted above, it is clear that MDBs are international 
intergovernmental organizations comprised and collectively 
governed by states. Furthermore, MDBs do not fit into the category 
of ‘non-state actors,’ regardless of the prevailing definition, because 
they often comprise groups that do not naturally align their interests 
with human rights issues, and that would not claim to be following 
relevant rules of international human rights law.55 
 
 51. U.N. Service Reparations, supra note 26, at 179. 
 52. See generally Alston, supra note 50, at 14-19. 
 53. Id. at 15 (quoting Bas Arts, Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Three 
Faces of Power 5 (Max Planck Project Group on Common Goods, Bonn, Working 
Paper 2003/4, 2003), available at http://edoc.mpg.de/175439 (follow “2003_4.pdf” 
hyperlink at bottom of page). 
 54. Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complainants and International 
Organizations: A Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in 
International Financial Institutions, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 403, 411 (2005). 
 55. Alston, supra note 50, at 29. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The law of responsibility is generally considered in relation to 
states because of their original and necessary legal personality at the 
international level. However, it encompasses a wide range of 
questions that must be considered along with the question of legal 
personality.56 Apart from states, other subjects of law, such as 
international organizations, can be found responsible according to 
international responsibility rules. For this purpose, the human rights 
obligations and the responsibility rules are analyzed in detail below, 
including their connection with MDBs’ acts. 
A.  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW OBLIGATIONS 
In determining the international responsibility of MDBs, the 
human rights obligations need to be identified prior to addressing the 
breach of those obligations. Within the Inter-American System on 
Human Rights (“Inter-American System”), these obligations are 
clearly reflected in the American Convention and have been well-
developed by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (“Inter-
American Court”). These obligations include: (1) to respect human 
rights; (2) to adopt domestic measures; and (3) to redress human 
rights violations.57 Although these obligations were established 
considering state parties’ compliance, mutatis mutandis they are 
suitable for application to international organizations such as MDBs. 
1.  Obligation to Respect Human Rights 
Generally, human rights treaties establish the obligation to respect 
all the rights they recognize in favor of all individuals under states’ 
jurisdiction. This obligation is enshrined in various international 
instruments.58 For instance, the American Convention clearly states 
that  
 
 56. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 419. 
 57. American Convention, supra note 34, arts. 1(1), 2, 63(1). 
 58. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 34, art. 1; OAS, Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69; U.N. Charter 
art. 55(c); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
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[t]he States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect 
the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise 
of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for 
reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, 
birth, or any other social condition.59 
The obligation to respect human rights constitutes the most 
important duty undertaken by states under international human rights 
law. According to the Inter-American Court in Velasquez Rodriguez, 
this obligation refers to two duties: (1) the duty to respect human 
rights protected by the human rights treaty; and (2) the duty to ensure 
the exercise of those rights to every person subject to state 
jurisdiction.60 The Court used the same analysis in later decisions. 
For example, in the Awas Tingni case, the Court concluded that the 
American Convention obligated the state “to organize public power 
so as to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights by the persons 
under its jurisdiction.”61 
It is clear that MDBs’ acts can infringe on the obligation to respect 
human rights by directly violating those rights or by being complicit 
in a state violation. In this regard, the nature of an entity’s 
compliance with this obligation will differ according to not only the 
right at stake, but also the entity that is called to comply with it. For 
instance, on the one hand, the obligation to respect the right to basic 
primary education is an obligation that must be fully fulfilled by the 
state.62 On the other hand, MDBs “may . . . have obligations not to 
 
Rights art. 2(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 7 (Dec. 18, 1990); International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination pmbl., G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) 
(Dec. 21, 1965); European Convention, supra note 34, art. 1; Council of Europe, 
European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 521 U.N.T.S. 89; African Charter, supra 
note 34, art. 1; League of Arab States, Arab Charter of Human Rights art. 3, Sept. 
15, 1994. 
 59. American Convention, supra note 34, art. 1, § 1. 
 60. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
4, ¶¶ 165-66 (July 29, 1988). 
 61. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 154 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 62. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 
151 (2006). 
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act in a way that prevents a borrowing state from fulfilling its 
obligations to provide such education.”63 The ECOSOC has 
emphasized that international intergovernmental organizations, 
which here include MBDs, have the obligation to take measures that 
are in line with their member states’ human rights obligations.64 
2.  Obligation to Adopt Domestic Measures 
The obligation to adopt domestic measures is critical when 
adjusting domestic law to accepted international human rights 
standards. In this regard, Article 2 of the American Convention 
provides that  
[w]here the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred 
to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other 
provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in 
accordance with their constitutional processes and the 
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or 
freedoms.65 
This obligation is directly related to the legislative branch of the 
government. In the Hilarie and Benjamin case, the Inter-American 
Court noted that states infringe upon this obligation not only by 
adopting legislative measures that are not in accordance with the 
standards established by human rights treaties, but also by failing to 
enforce laws that protect the rights guaranteed under the treaties.66 
According to the Court, these acts would likewise violate Article 2 of 
the American Convention.67 
MDBs’ acts can also be subject to the obligation to adopt domestic 
measures. MDBs can infringe on it by being complicit in a state 
violation of human rights or by forcing or otherwise causing states to 
violate human rights. This is particularly true, for instance, when 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Procedural Decisions, ¶ 515, U.N. 
Doc. E/1999/22 (1999) [hereinafter Procedural Decisions] (encouraging 
international intergovernmental organizations to enact “policies and programmes 
which promote respect for [human] rights”). 
 65. American Convention, supra note 34, art. 2. 
 66. Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, ¶ 113 (June 21, 2002). 
 67. Id. 
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MDBs finance projects for borrowing states concerning the adoption 
of new domestic legislation that is not in accordance with accepted 
international human rights standards. 
3.  Obligation to Redress Human Rights Violations 
The obligation to redress human rights violations emerges once a 
court has determined the state’s international responsibility because 
of concrete human rights violations. For instance, Article 63(1) of the 
American Convention provides that  
[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or 
freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule 
that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or 
freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, 
that the consequences of the measure or situation that 
constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied 
and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.68 
The obligation in question is well-established in customary 
international law, which has been developed by international human 
rights law. In De la Cruz-Flores, the Inter-American Court stated 
that “Article 63(1) of the American Convention contains a norm of 
customary law that is one of the fundamental principles of 
contemporary international law on State responsibility.”69 In this 
regard, the Court highlighted that an unlawful act, attributable to a 
state, creates international responsibility for that state’s violation of 
international law; as a result, the state is obligated to prevent the 
violation from continuing any further, as well as to address any 
consequences and harms that arise out of that violation.70 
MDBs can be challenged regarding the observance of the 
obligation to redress human rights violations. MDBs’ acts can 
infringe on that obligation by being complicit in a state violation of 
human rights. For instance, MDBs’ acts breach this obligation by 
providing financing to borrowing states that have been condemned 
by international tribunals due to human rights violations without first 
requiring that those states redress such violations prior to receiving 
 
 68. American Convention, supra note 34, art. 63. 
 69. Case of De la Cruz-Flores v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 115, ¶ 
139 (Nov. 18, 2004). 
 70. Id. 
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financing. The ECOSOC clearly called upon the World Bank “to pay 
enhanced attention in their activities to respect for economic, social 
and cultural rights, including . . . facilitating the development of 
appropriate remedies for responding to violations” of those rights.71 
4. Other Obligations 
In addition to the main human rights obligations, when applying 
and interpreting human rights treaties, international tribunals have 
construed other states’ duties, such as the obligation to prevent, 
investigate and punish human rights violations. In Velasquez 
Rodriguez, the Court determined that states have a legal duty to 
prevent human rights violations, as well as to engage in meaningful 
investigations of the violations committed within their jurisdiction in 
order to identify those responsible and impose a proper punishment.72 
According to Velasquez Rodriguez, the state can be found 
responsible for human rights violations resulting from illegal acts not 
directly imputable to it because of the state’s failure to take steps to 
prevent human rights violations.73 In imputing responsibility for 
human rights violations to states, the Court established as decisive 
whether a human rights violation has been perpetrated with the 
government’s support, or whether the government has allowed the 
act to occur without preventing it or punishing those responsible.74 
Given that MDBs can contribute to the state violation of human 
rights by funding projects that affect human rights protected by 
international law, these obligations can also relate back to MDBs 
acts via the due diligence approach. 
B.  CONTEMPORARY RESPONSIBILITY RULES 
Other sources for state responsibility exist outside of the 
international human rights obligations discussed above. The ILC has 
codified the principles of international law governing state 
responsibility under the Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
 
 71. Procedural Decisions, supra note 64, ¶ 515. 
 72. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
4, ¶ 174 (July 29, 1988). 
 73. Id. ¶ 172. 
 74. Id. ¶ 173. 
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Internationally Wrongful Acts.75 According to the ILC, the essential 
elements for the establishment of state responsibility are: (1) a breach 
of an international obligation of the state; and (2) the attribution of 
that breach to the state under international law.76 This is the natural 
consequence of the principle that “[e]very internationally wrongful 
act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.”77 
These essentials of state responsibility have been applied by 
international tribunals when determining states’ responsibility for 
human rights violations. In this regard, it is important to take into 
account the human rights obligations discussed earlier in this Part. 
For instance, with respect to the first element for the establishment of 
state responsibility, the Inter-American Court highlighted in 
Velasquez Rodriguez that Article 1(1) of the American Convention 
plays a critical role when considering the human rights obligations of 
States Parties, provided that it obligates them to respect the rights 
recognized in the Convention.78 Regarding the second essential point 
of state responsibility, the Court pointed out that “[a]ny impairment 
of those rights which can be attributed under the rules of 
international law to the action or omission of any public authority 
constitutes an act imputable to the State.”79 Moreover, the Court 
clarified that “under international law a State is responsible for the 
acts of its agents undertaken in their official capacity and for their 
omissions, even when those agents act outside the sphere of their 
authority or violate internal law.”80 
C.  MDBS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
There is a gap in the international legal framework with regard to 
the attribution of direct responsibility to international organizations 
 
 75. In 2001, the ILC adopted the Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, which were later submitted to the U.N. General 
Assembly in its 2001 session. The General Assembly commended them to the 
attention of governments. See generally Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (outlining responsibility, 
attribution, consequences, and reparations for wrongs performed by states). 
 76. Id. art. 2. 
 77. Id. art. 1. 
 78. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
4, ¶ 164 (July 29, 1988). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. ¶ 170. 
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such as MDBs for human rights violations that take place in 
developing countries as a result of MDB-financed projects. As a 
result of this jurisdictional gap, MDBs are not subjects of 
international law in this context, and international tribunals thus 
cannot hold MDBs accountable for infringing human rights 
violations. That is to say, the law of responsibility does not address 
states’ collective acts under the guise of MDBs. The existing rules 
are based on states’ responsibility, given their individual non-
compliance with human rights treaty-obligations. Hence, whenever 
MDBs commit wrongful acts that result in human rights violations, 
international human rights tribunals only hold the underlying state 
responsible, and not the MDB. 
There is a need to create new legal standards directly applicable to 
MDBs, in order to fill the jurisdictional gap in the existing 
international legal framework. At present, MDBs are only subject to 
the legal restraints of their own mandates as established by their 
constituent instruments. These instruments do not include human 
rights standards or obligations as they exist today. As a matter of 
fact, the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement were signed in 1944 
prior to both the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Consequently, MDBs operate under a situation of 
lawlessness.  
The new legal standards directly applicable to MDBs should be 
based on currently prevailing international human rights law 
principles. They should address, inter alia: MDBs’ wrongful acts 
that directly violate human rights; MDBs’ wrongful acts that are 
complicit in a state violation of human rights; MDBs’ actions that 
cause or force states to violate human rights; and MDBs’ wrongful 
acts that facilitate or make possible private violations of human 
rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”) has 
developed legal approaches for holding MDBs accountable for 
wrongful acts and acts that result in human rights violations, and has 
provided guidance for the creation of standards more generally. In 
the Waite & Kennedy case, the Court addressed the question of 
jurisdictional immunity of international organizations.81 According to 
 
 81. See generally Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999) 
(determining the human rights compatibility of grants of jurisdictional immunity to 
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the Court, States would circumvent the purposes of the European 
Convention of Human Rights by giving certain competencies to 
international intergovernmental organizations and then granting them 
immunity for exercising those competencies if the States were 
thereby relieved of their own accountability.82 In the Matthews 
case,83 while confirming its previous reasoning,84 the Court added 
that member States’ responsibility continues after the transfer of 
competences to international intergovernmental organizations, which 
is not prohibited under the Convention since the rights thereunder 
continue to be ‘secured.’85 
Because states currently are ultimately responsible for MDBs’ 
wrongful acts, states should seriously pursue MDBs’ direct 
responsibility for the purpose of preventing or limiting their own 
individual responsibility before international tribunals. Indeed, the 
ECOSOC recommended that obligations under the Convention 
should be considered in all aspects of a member state’s negotiations 
with international financial institutions, in order to ensure that 
Convention rights are not undermined.86  
The direct attribution of responsibility to MDBs can be achieved 
by changing the existing rules on the law of responsibility to 
encompass MDBs’ direct responsibility for human rights violations 
that occur as a result of projects that they have financed. In so doing, 
the international legal framework will be developed progressively in 
accordance with the existing circumstances surrounding the 
influence of MDBs in developing countries. 
 
international organizations). 
 82. Id. ¶ 67. 
 83. See generally Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 31 (1999) (concerning “whether the United Kingdom can be held 
responsible under the Article 1 of the Convention for the absence of elections to 
the European Parliament in Gibraltar, that is, whether the United Kingdom is 
required to ‘secure’ elections to the European Parliament notwithstanding the 
Community character of those elections”). 
 84. Id. ¶¶ 31-35 (finding that, because contracting States retain responsibility 
for securing rights within the European Convention, the United Kingdom was 
responsible for the violation of those rights). 
 85. Id. ¶ 32. 
 86. ECOSOC, Conclusions and Recommendations, Jordan, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.46 (2000). 
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1. Responsibility of MDBs Before International Tribunals 
The attribution of responsibility to MDBs may be justified on 
several grounds. As stated in Part II, MDBs do possess an 
international legal personality, and are therefore capable of 
possessing rights and obligations under international law.87 One of 
the derivate features of this personality is the capacity to bear 
international responsibility in certain cases.88 Responsibility is a 
natural corollary of possessing rights and duties under international 
law. 
MDB responsibility can be justified on general principles of 
international law.89 These principles “derive from common rules 
drawn from the major legal systems of the world, which are 
appropriate for application in the international community.”90 
General principles of international law serve as a particularly 
dynamic source of law that has a significant value in those spheres in 
which there is not yet enough state practice to crystallize into 
customary international law.91 
Moreover, the principle that international organizations may be 
held internationally responsible has developed firmly into a rule of 
customary international law.92 According to legal authorities, “[t]he 
element of ‘practice’ is evidenced by the practice of international 
organizations and states, and the element of opinio juris is clearly 
evidenced by the overwhelming opinions of writers and the decisions 
of international institutions.”93 It is important to highlight that 
 
 87. See generally U.N. Service Reparations, supra note 26, at 179 (concluding 
that the United Nations possesses international legal personality and may make 
claims against states). 
 88. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 419 (“In international relations . . . the 
invasion of the legal interest of one subject of the law by another legal person 
creates responsibility in various forms . . . .”). 
 89. Cf. MOSHE HIRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS TOWARDS THIRD PARTIES: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES 9 (1995) 
(attributing international responsibility to states based on general principles of 
international law). 
 90. Id. at 37. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 9. 
 93. Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted). 
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international law governs the international character of an 
international organization’s wrongful acts.94 
The ILC has also codified the principles of international law 
governing the responsibility of international organizations under the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. 
These principles should play a critical role when considering the 
responsibility of MDBs as international organizations. According to 
the ILC, the essentials of the responsibility of international 
organizations are: (1) a breach of an international obligation by the 
international organization and (2) attribution of that breach to an 
international organization under international law.95 As stated earlier, 
with respect to state responsibility, these essentials are the necessary 
corollary of the principle that “[e]very internationally wrongful act of 
an international organization entails the international responsibility 
of the international organization.”96 
International organizations such as MDBs are responsible for the 
acts of their agents and organs when acting in that capacity. 
Accordingly, international legal principles support the notion that 
“[t]he conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization 
in the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be 
considered an act of that organization under international law 
whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the 
organization.”97 
In the Loizidou case, the European Court established responsibility 
through agents as a governing principle with regards to international 
organizations.98 Though this principle was established concerning 
state responsibility, mutatis mutandis it is suitable for the application 
in the sphere of international organizations such as MDBs. As an 
international organization, the international responsibility of an MDB 
 
 94. INT’L L. ASS’N. COMM. ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF INT’L ORGS., REPORT OF 
THE SEVENTY-FIRST CONFERENCE 27 (2004) (dismissing as relatively unimportant 
the way in which the “internal legal order” of an international organization might 
characterize that organization’s act). 
 95. U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles 1, 2 and 3, supra note 33, art. 3(2). 
 96. Id. art. 3(1). 
 97. U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations - 
Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 Adopted by the Drafting 
Committee, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.648 (May 27, 2004). 
 98. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 52 (1996). 
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is thus compromised by the acts of its agents and organs outside the 
territory of the state in which it is based.  
According to the ILC, “[t]here is a breach of an international 
obligation by an international organization when an act is not in 
conformity with what is required by that obligation.”99 International 
obligations arise not only from treaties but also from other sources of 
international law as enunciated in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, 
especially from unwritten law such as customary international law 
and general principles.100 For instance, many human rights 
obligations arising out of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
have crystallized in binding rules of customary international law.101 
Additionally, the ECOSOC can intervene where there are patterns of 
systematic gross human rights violations even though there is no 
treaty violation.102 
Finally, international tribunals can be embodied with jurisdiction 
over MDBs in order to directly determine their human rights 
responsibility via amendments to central human rights treaties and 
the creation of new legal standards. According to contemporary 
treaty law rules, international tribunals can exercise jurisdiction over 
contracting parties, since they have ratified human rights treaties and 
accepted their contentious jurisdiction.103 Since MDBs possess a 
distinct legal personality under international law, they are capable of 
becoming parties of the concerned human rights system if the rules 
are changed to allow them to satisfy the indicated requirements. 
If it is concluded that MDBs cannot meet the formal requirements 
for granting jurisdiction to international tribunals, a ‘functional treaty 
succession’ from states parties to the concerned MDB may be 
performed.104 Indeed, such succession existed with respect to the 
 
 99. U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations - 
Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles 8-16 Adopted by the Drafting Committee, art. 
8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.666/Rev.1 (June 1, 2005). 
 100. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 101. CLAPHAM, supra note 62, at 86. 
 102. Alston, supra note 50, at 39. 
 103. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 34, art. 62 (declaring that state 
parties to the American Convention are subject to the binding jurisdiction of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights once they ratify the Convention and 
declare their recognition of that jurisdiction). 
 104. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
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succession relationship between European Community and its 
Member States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.105 
According to the European Court of Justice, under the European 
Economic Community Treaty, “the Community has assumed the 
powers previously exercised by Member States in the area governed 
by the General Agreement, [and thus] the provisions of that 
agreement have the effect of binding the Community.”106 
Consequently, this functional succession could be relevant with 
respect to states that may transfer their human rights obligations to 
international inter-governmental organizations such as MDBs. 
IV. MDBS’ APPROACHES WITH REGARD TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
MDBs are part of larger international organizations in which 
human rights protection, as established by their constituent charters, 
plays a critical role in guiding the actions of their organs and agents. 
For instance, the World Bank’s parent organization is the United 
Nations. The World Bank is a specialized agency of the United 
Nations by virtue of the agreement entered into with the ECOSOC107 
in accordance with related Articles of the U.N. Charter.108 The U.N. 
Charter expressly calls for the universal respect of human rights and 
 
Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978,1946 U.N.T.S. 3 (describing the ways in which one state 
succeeds another in treaty obligations). 
 105. Reinisch, supra note 1, at 83. 
 106. International Fruit Co. et al. v. Produkschap voor Gruenten en Fruit (Joined 
Cases 21-24/72), 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1227. 
 107. Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development art. 1(2), Apr. 15, 1948, 109 U.N.T.S. 341 (“The 
Bank is a specialized agency established by agreement among its member 
Governments and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in its 
Articles of Agreement, in economic and related fields within the meaning of 
Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations. By reason of the nature of its 
international responsibilities . . . the Bank is, and is required to function as, an 
independent international organization.”). 
 108. See U.N. Charter, art. 57 (stating that specialized agencies are those 
intergovernmental organizations operating in conjunction with the United Nations 
and pursuant to Article 63 of the Charter). Article 63(2), in turn, provides that 
ECOSOC “. . . may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through 
consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through 
recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United 
Nations.” Id. art. 63(2). 
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fundamental freedoms without discrimination,109 as well as for 
cooperation with the United Nations for the achievement of this 
purpose.110 As such, the World Bank should adopt the obligation to 
respect the human rights purposes and principles of the Charter of its 
parent organization.111  
There is no express provision in MDBs’ constituent instruments 
preventing their involvement with human rights issues. The so called 
‘political prohibition’ cannot be used as a valid ‘legal’ excuse to 
avoid international human rights obligations.112 The ‘political 
prohibition’ doctrine was construed based on a restrictive 
interpretation of Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD and Article 5, 
Section 6 of the International Development Association (“IDA”) 
Articles of Agreement. Interpreting these provisions in 1990, the 
World Bank’s General Counsel stated that they exclude political 
considerations and prohibit the Bank from taking non-economic 
considerations into account.113 
The World Bank itself has recognized the interconnection between 
its operations and human rights protection. The outgoing World 
Bank General Council released a legal opinion in January 2006, 
recognizing that the balance has now shifted in favor of protecting 
human rights.114 Furthermore, the General Counsel concluded that 
 
 109. Id. art. 55(c) 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote: . . . (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. 
Id. 
 110. Id. art. 56. 
 111. See DARROW, supra note 38, at 125 (describing the explicit obligation that 
the Bank has to follow the decisions of the U.N. Security Council, and the 
resulting implicit obligation to follow the U.N.’s lead with respect to human rights 
violations). 
 112. CLAPHAM, supra note 62, at 143. 
 113. See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Issues of “Governance” in Borrowing 
Members – The Extent of Their Relevance under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, 
in IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK LEGAL PAPERS ch. 10 (2000). 
 114. See generally ROBERTO DANINO, GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE WORLD 
BANK, LEGAL OPINION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD BANK 
(Jan. 27, 2006) (on file with author) (“The World Bank’s objectives and activities 
are deeply supportive of the substantive realization of human rights.”). 
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the Articles of Agreement allow the Bank to acknowledge the human 
rights dimensions of its policies and operations.115  
This legal opinion constitutes a clear progressive evolution from 
the pre-existing restrictive legal interpretation of the World Bank’s 
approach to human rights. According to the World Bank’s General 
Counsel, the opinion “is ‘permissive’: allowing, but not mandating, 
action on the part of the Bank in relation to human rights.”116 It 
makes “the state of the law” clear and permits the Bank to properly 
update its internal legal stance according to the current international 
legal order.117 
The World Bank has also recognized the benefits of its 
involvement with the human rights obligations of its member states. 
According to a recent statement of the current World Bank General 
Council in October 2006, “[t]he World Bank’s role is a facilitative 
one, in helping [its] members realize their human rights 
obligations.”118  If the World Bank views its role in this way, then 
respecting human rights obligations should not create negative 
externalities.119 
MDBs have developed operational policies on specific themes, but 
they do not reflect accepted international human rights related 
standards. There is no doubt that MDBs “choose their own 
definitions and standards of human rights, influenced by but rarely 
based directly on internationally agreed standards.”120 These 
decisions respond to what is politically acceptable within and among 
an MDB’s member states.121 For instance, the IADB has adopted an 
Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples that does not reflect the 
 
 115. Id. ¶ 25. 
 116. Ana Palacio, The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank 
(2006), available at http://go.worldbank.org/RR8FOU4RG0. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (asserting that consideration of human rights obligations “would not be 
the basis for an increase in Bank conditionalities, . . . an obstacle for disbursement, 
[or an] increase [to] the cost of doing business”). 
 120. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
Interim Report on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006) (prepared by John Ruggie) [hereinafter U.N. H.R. & 
Transnat’l Corp. Rep.]. 
 121. Id. 
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existing international standards on the collective rights of indigenous 
peoples.122 
MDBs have also developed inspection mechanisms for 
accountability purposes. Some scholars note that, “[l]egally, these 
mechanisms have turned out to be effective forums in which 
adversely affected persons can raise claims that relate to their rights 
as indigenous people or as involuntarily resettled people.”123 But 
from an international human rights law perspective, they are not 
effective in addressing human rights violations resulting from their 
financed-projects. The U.N. Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises has also found these 
mechanisms to be ineffective.124  
This Part provides guidance for the ongoing discussions on 
whether MDBs’ operational policies reflect international human 
rights standards, as well as whether MDBs’ inspection mechanisms 
are effective. First, this Part identifies well-accepted international 
standards regarding the collective rights of indigenous peoples, 
which should contribute to the progressive development of the 
existing operational policies on indigenous peoples. Next, this Part 
identifies the essentials of the right to an effective remedy as 
established under international human rights law as critical factors to 
be considered when determining the effectiveness of MDBs’ 
inspection mechanisms from an international law point of view. 
A.  OPERATIONAL POLICIES ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
MDBs have developed operational policies on specific themes, 
such as indigenous peoples. These policies apply to the “design, 
appraisal, and/or implementation of [MDB] operations, funded in 
whole or part by [their] loans or grants.”125 For instance, the IADB 
 
 122. See generally INDIAN L. RES. CTR., COMENTARIOS AL BORRADOR DE 
POLÍTICA OPERATIVA SOBRE PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS PUBLICADO POR EL BANCO 
INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO, July 29, 2005, available at 
http://www.indianlaw.org/main/resources/mdb. 
 123. Bradlow, supra note 54, at 410. 
 124. See U.N. H.R. & Transnat’l Corp. Rep., supra note 120, ¶ 53 (explaining 
that, despite some work in the right direction by transnational corporations, 
protections are still incomplete and lack uniformity). 
 125. Bradlow, supra note 54, at 422. 
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adopted the ‘Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples’ (“OP-765”) 
on February 22, 2006; the World Bank adopted the ‘Revised 
Operational Policy and Bank Procedure on Indigenous Peoples’ 
(“OP/BP 4.10”) on May 10, 2005; and the IFC adopted ‘Performance 
Standard 7 Indigenous Peoples’ on April 30, 2006. 
Some of the themes addressed through MDBs’ operational policies 
were already well-established in international human rights law. For 
instance, when applying human rights treaties the supervisory bodies 
considered the rights of indigenous peoples extensively, especially 
within the Inter-American System.126 The human rights standards 
developed by the supervisory bodies are particularly relevant when 
considering the rights of indigenous peoples vis-à-vis MDB 
financed-projects, especially extractive industry projects. 
A number of human rights law principles specifically protect the 
rights of indigenous peoples.127 These rights deal with several issues 
of relevance for the well-being of indigenous peoples as distinct 
peoples. With respect to extractive industry projects on indigenous 
lands financed by MDBs, the most important rights include property 
rights to land and natural resources and the right to self-
determination. Additionally, as a procedural guarantee, the free, 
prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples plays a critical 
role in ensuring states’ compliance with the duty to respect the 
aforementioned rights. These rights are of a collective nature, and are 
critical for the survival of indigenous peoples’ government and 
society. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
states that “indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are 
indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral 
development as peoples.”128 
 
 126. See generally INDIAN L. RES. CTR., COMENTARIOS AL BORRADOR DE LA 
POLÍTICA OPERATIVA SOBRE PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS PUBLICADO POR EL BANCO 
INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (2005). 
 127. See, e.g., U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, pmbl., U.N. Doc A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (“[I]ndigenous peoples 
are equal to all other peoples.”) 
 128. See id.; see also OAS, Record of the Current Status of the Draft American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous  Peoples, art. VI(1), 
GT/DADIN/doc.301/07 (Apr. 27, 2007) (containing draft language that eventually 
ended up in the U.N. Declaration). 
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The following sections of this Part address the question of the 
international standards on the collective rights of indigenous peoples 
as developed by human rights instruments and supervisory bodies, in 
order to identify and determine their extension. MDBs should not 
only consider these internationally well-established standards when 
drafting their operational policies, but they should also use them 
when investigating and making recommendations to their Boards of 
Directors on specific projects through their inspection mechanisms. 
1.  Property Rights to Land and Natural Resources 
Indigenous peoples’ property rights to land and natural resources 
are critical in assuring their physical and cultural survival as distinct 
peoples within existing nation-states. According to political leaders, 
“[w]ithout their land base, [indigenous peoples] may be able to 
survive as individuals in the dominant economy and culture of their 
[non-indigenous] neighbors, but they will not be able to survive and 
prosper as distinct peoples with distinct cultures and traditions.”129 It 
is clear that “governments throughout the Americas, led by 
Europeans and their descendants, have sought to expropriate, allot, 
and control [indigenous] land and resources as a means of 
assimilating [indigenous peoples].”130 Consequently, legislation and 
policies built on the presumption of European superiority over native 
culture are no longer sustainable. 
A number of rules of international human rights law protect 
indigenous peoples’ property rights to land and natural resources. 
First, international treaty law rules guarantee the protection of 
indigenous peoples’ property rights to land and natural resources, 
including the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) Convention 
169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries.131 
 
 129. See generally Armstrong Wiggins, Indian Rights and the Environment, 18 
YALE J. INT’L L. 345, 348 (1993) (discussing the rights of Indian tribes in Central 
and South America) [hereinafter Wiggins, Indian Rights and the Environment]. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See International Labor Organization, Convention concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 14(1), ILOLEX C169 (June 27, 
1989). 
The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the 
lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition, 
measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the 
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Second, international customary law rules protect indigenous 
peoples’ right to lands and natural resources. In this regard, it is 
important to note that the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples contains several rules of customary international 
law on indigenous issues.  For instance, Article 26 of the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples affirms that 
indigenous peoples have ownership, development, use, and control 
rights over lands and resources that the people have traditionally 
owned, occupied, or used, and that the state should give legal 
recognition to these rights.132 
Third, general principles of international law also protect 
indigenous peoples’ collective property rights to lands. Numerous 
national constitutions in Latin American countries have a specific 
provision related to such recognition and protection, including 
Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, and Peru.133 Even the United States appears to 
concede the importance of these property rights. In a statement at the 
OAS, the U.S. affirmed that “[i]ndigenous peoples should have the 
collective right to lands that they own or occupy, including sub-
surface resources. States should give legal recognition to such lands 
and resources and this recognition should be conducted with due 
 
peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to 
which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional 
activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples 
and shifting cultivators in this respect. 
Id.; see also id. art. 15(1) (addressing the right of indigenous people to the natural 
resources on their land). 
 132. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 127, 
art. 26 (requiring that the state respect the indigenous peoples’ traditional customs 
and system of land ownership). 
 133. CONSTITUCION DE ARGENTINA art. 75.17; REPUBLICA DEL BOLIVIA 
CONSTITUCION DE 2009 art. 171; REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA CONSTITUCION DE 
1985 CON LAS REFORMA DE 1993 arts. 67-68; REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR 
CONSTITUCIONES DE 2008 art. 84.2; CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESDADOS 
UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 27.VII, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federacion 
[D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917, (Mex.); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA 
DE NICARAGUA [Cn.] art. 89, La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 January 1987, as amended by Ley 
No. 330, Reforma Parcial a la Constitucion Politica de la Republica de Nicaragua, 
Jan. 18, 2000, L.G. Jan. 19, 2000; CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE 
PANAMA art. 123; REPUBLICA DE PARAGUAY CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE 1992 art. 
64; CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU 1993 CON LAS REFORMAS DE 1995, 2000, 
2002, 2004, Y 2005 (HASTA OCTUBRE) art. 89. 
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respect to the customs, traditions, and land tenure systems of 
indigenous peoples.”134 
Finally, international human rights treaty bodies have strongly 
recognized the rights of indigenous peoples to their land and natural 
resources. For example, the Inter-American Court has developed 
consistent case law on this matter by recognizing indigenous 
peoples’ collective property rights to lands.135 In the Awas Tigni case, 
the Court acknowledged that “[a]mong indigenous peoples there is a 
communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collective 
property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not 
centered on an individual but rather on the group and its 
community.”136 Consequently, the Court concluded that Article 21 of 
the American Convention also protects the collective nature of 
indigenous peoples’ property rights to land.137 
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples has also 
clearly proclaimed indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over 
their natural resources, including sub-surface resources. According to 
the Special Rapporteur, it “might properly be described as a 
collective right by virtue of which the State is obligated to respect, 
protect, and promote the governmental and property interests of 
indigenous peoples (as collectivities) in their natural resources.”138 
The Special Rapporteur acknowledged that, “in the absence of any 
 
 134. United States Delegation, Remarks at the Tenth Meeting of Negotiations in 
the Quest for Points of Consensus of the OAS Working Group to Prepare the Draft 
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Principles on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 5, OEA/Ser.K/XVI, GT/DADIN/doc.295/07, corr. 
1 (Apr. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples]. 
 135. See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 222 (Mar. 29, 2006) (finding that denial of land rights to the 
Sawhoyamaxa is detrimental to the community’s values); Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 157-58 (June 17, 
2005) (remarking that the right to live in ancestral territory flows from the right to 
life); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 104, 139 (Aug. 31, 2001) (accepting the Commission’s 
argument that the failure to adopt measures protecting the land and resources of the 
Awas Tingi violated Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention). 
 136. See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149. 
 137. Id. ¶ 148. 
 138. U.N. Special Rapporteur, Erica-Irene A. Daes, Indigenous Peoples’ 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, ¶ 40, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 (July 
13, 2004). 
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prior, fair and lawful disposition of the resources, indigenous peoples 
are the owners of the natural resources on or under their land and 
territories.”139 The Special Rapporteur further recognized that, 
“[i]ndigenous peoples, if deprived of the natural resources pertaining 
to their lands and territories, would be deprived of meaningful 
economic and political self-determination.”140 
Accordingly, there is a clear duty to respect the aforementioned 
indigenous property rights. The Inter-American Court defined this 
duty as including two obligations. First, states have a positive 
obligation to demarcate and title indigenous lands.141 Second, states 
have a negative obligation to prevent their agents or third parties 
from acting in ways that might affect the indigenous territory.142 
2.  Right to Self-Determination and Self-Government 
The right to self-determination also plays a critical role in assuring 
the involvement of indigenous peoples’ government in the decision-
making process regarding projects that might affect their collective 
interests, such as land and natural resources. The right to self-
determination includes the right to self-government, which implies 
the collective right to exercise full authority over land and natural 
resources. Private and governmental outsiders must be prepared to 
respect the authority and decisions stemming from the relevant 
indigenous customary law and decision-making institutions. 
Generally speaking, international conventions have established the 
right to self-determination of peoples.143 In particular, indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination is recognized by international 
human rights law principles, such as the principles established under 
the ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries.144 Additionally, the U.N. Declaration on 
 
 139. Id. ¶ 54. 
 140. Id. ¶ 58. 
 141. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 1 (granting universally the right to 
self-determination, and specifically addressing the right to engage in different 
forms of development and to pursue various “means of subsistence”). 
 144. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 131, art. 7 (affirming the rights of indigenous people to 
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the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination145 and self-government.146 Finally, the 
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples also 
establishes the right of indigenous peoples to participate in decision-
making processes dealing with matters that might affect their 
collective interests.147 
Some states have adopted the same approach. According to the 
United States, states should recognize “that indigenous peoples have 
the collective right to self-determination within the nations in which 
they reside,” which means the right to self-government in matters 
relating to their internal affairs, including economic activities, land 
and resource management, and the environment.148 
Based on the above, it is clear that the right to self-determination 
of indigenous peoples is a collective right deeply connected with 
property rights to land and natural resources. By virtue of these 
rights, indigenous peoples should participate in the decision-making 
process related to projects that might affect their collective interests. 
Consequently, the concerned indigenous people must be consulted 
by the corresponding state agency when reviewing instruments for 
environmental assessment dealing with extractive industry projects 
financed by MDBs and developed on indigenous lands. 
3.  The Question of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent 
Prior to the approval of any extractive industry project financed by 
MDBs within indigenous lands, the corresponding environmental 
state agency has to consult with the potential project-affected 
 
direct and control their own development). 
 145. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 127, 
art. 3. This instrument represents the most updated legal statement on indigenous 
self-determination as it was recently adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 
September 13, 2007. Id. 
 146. See id. art. 4 (“Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to 
their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their 
autonomous functions.”). 
 147. See id. art. 18 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in 
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives 
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to 
maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.”). 
 148. Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 134, ¶ 3. 
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indigenous community as early as possible. When seeking 
indigenous peoples’ consent, the consent must include all of the 
following factors: (1) “free”, in the sense that the consent should be 
given without coercion, duress, bribery, or any threat or external 
manipulation; (2) “prior”, in that the consent should be given before 
each decision-making stage in the project’s planning and 
implementation; and (3) “informed”, meaning that the consent 
should be given only after the project-affected indigenous 
community has been provided with all material information related 
to the project in an appropriate language and format.149 It is important 
to emphasize that free, prior, and informed consent (“FPIC”) is a 
procedural guarantee—not a substantial right—recognized in favor 
of indigenous peoples whose land and natural resources might be 
affected by extractive industry projects. Therefore, it does not act as 
a substitute for substantive rights in play, such as property rights to 
land and natural resources, and the right to self-determination. 
FPIC has relevant legal effects in the context of processes created 
for environmental assessment purposes. This is true because it 
recognizes: (1) the prerogative of indigenous peoples to prohibit, 
control, or authorize projects to be developed within their lands and 
territories or related to their natural resources; and (2) the prerogative 
of indigenous peoples to prohibit, control, or authorize projects that 
will not take place within their land, but might substantially affect 
their land, territories and natural resources, or might otherwise affect 
their human rights.150  
International human rights law principles clearly establish the 
importance of FPIC of indigenous peoples with regards to land and 
natural resource rights. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples states that “[s]tates shall consult and cooperate in 
 
 149. See Armstrong Wiggins, Staff, Indian Law Resource Center, Address at 
U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: Indigenous Peoples’ Right of Free 
Prior and Informed Consent with Respect to Indigenous Lands, Territories and 
Resources (Jan. 17-19, 2005); see also Armstrong Wiggins, Moderator, Free Prior 
Informed Consent For Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities: A Briefing for 
World Bank Executive Directors (June 14, 2004) available at 
http://www.bicusa.org/Legacy/FPIC_ briefing_documents.pdf. 
 150. See Wiggins, Indian Rights and the Environment, supra note 129, at 348-
349 (observing that, although Indians may eventually threaten their home 
environments in much the same way that others do, Indian communities have 
“successfully fought to keep the regions green”). 
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good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or 
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other 
resources.”151 Furthermore, according to Article 15(2) of ILO 
Convention 169, states “shall establish or maintain procedures 
through which they shall consult [indigenous] peoples, with a view 
to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be 
prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the 
exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their 
lands.”152 
Finally, human rights supervisory treaty bodies have also 
recognized the critical role of FPIC in assuring the respect of 
indigenous peoples’ substantial rights. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights stated in the Dann case that states 
should take the necessary steps to ensure recognition of the 
communal property rights of the indigenous people, and to ensure 
that such rights were not waived without FPIC.153 
Based on the above, the corresponding state agency must carry out 
a special consultation considering the appropriate indigenous 
community’s native language, customary law, and self-determined 
decision-making institutions. Only by virtue of such consultation and 
the project-affected indigenous community’s involvement can the 
state agency’s project be deemed to have been implemented in 
accordance with the collective rights and procedural guarantees of 
international human rights law.  
B.  INSPECTION MECHANISMS  
MDBs have created inspection organs for internal ‘accountability’ 
purposes. For instance, the World Bank created the Inspection Panel 
in 1993,154 the IADB shaped the Independent Investigation 
 
 151. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 127, art. 
32(2). 
 152. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 131, art. 15(2). 
 153. Mary & Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report 75/02, ¶ 131 (2002). 
 154. Bradlow, supra note 54, at 409. 
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Mechanism in 1994,155 and the IFC established the office of the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman in 1999.156 Through these 
inspection organs it is possible to hold MDBs accountable for actions 
that cause or threaten to cause serious harm to affected complainants, 
and actions that are inconsistent with MDBs’ own operational 
policies and procedures.157 It is important to highlight that they did so 
not because of their own political will, but rather as a result of a 
considerable demand for accountability from project-affected 
people.158 
These inspection mechanisms do not effectively address human 
rights violations because they do not match the right to an effective 
remedy under international human rights law. Furthermore, even if 
these mechanisms do resolve human rights issues related to an MDB 
financed-project, such an outcome only benefits the specific project-
affected people—not others in the same situation. On the contrary, 
the decisions adopted by human rights treaty bodies benefit other 
people in circumstances similar to those addressed in individual 
cases. This is true not only because of the erga omnes concept 
governing international human rights law,159 but also in light of the 
fact that apart from the condemned state, other state parties of the 
human rights system are starting to comply with those decisions even 
if they are not the condemned party of the concrete case.160 
 
 155. Id. at 420. 
 156. Id. at 432. 
 157. Id. at 408. 
 158. Id. (observing that many non-state actors viewed “MDBs’ ability to escape 
accountability [as] incompatible with the principles of good governance being 
advocated by the [banks] themselves”). 
 159. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT HAS ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF THE ERGA 
OMNES OBLIGATIONS BY STATING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION, WHICH CONSTITUTES A JUS COGENS NORM, “ENTAILS 
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES OF PROTECTION THAT BIND ALL STATES AND GIVE RISE 
TO EFFECTS WITH REGARD TO THIRD PARTIES, INCLUDING INDIVIDUALS.” ADVISORY 
OPINION 18/03, JURIDICAL CONDITION AND RIGHTS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED 
MIGRANTS, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (SER. A) NO. 18, ¶ 110 (SEPT. 17, 2003). 
 160. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN] [National Supreme 
Court Of Justice], 14/06/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación ilegítima 
de la libertad” (Arg.); Juzgado Federal de Buenos Aires, 19/03/2004, “Suarez 
Mason, Guillermo y otros s/homicidio agravado, privación ilegal de la libertad 
agravada” (Arg.) (taking into account the Inter-American Court’s decision in the 
Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru concerning impunity laws); see also CSJN, 7/04/95, 
“Giroldi Horacio David y Otro S/Recurso de Casación” (Arg.) (stating that the 
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The organs charged with carrying out the inspection are not 
independent from the MDBs themselves. Indeed, because of the fact 
that the mechanisms are internal—not external from the MDBs 
themselves—the inspection organs have to report to the decision-
making body. Nevertheless, there is a growing opinion that these 
mechanisms are ‘independent’ based on their independence from the 
organization’s management, as well as their reporting 
requirements.161 
These inspection organs do not constitute international tribunals 
specialized in human rights law, and they therefore do not adjudicate 
legal issues. Generally speaking, international tribunals possess 
contentious and advisory competence concerning legal issues,162 and 
are comprised of judges.163 Therefore, their decisions are final for,164 
and legally binding on, the parties of the case.165 On the other hand, 
MDBs’ inspection organs do not meet all these requirements. First, 
they do not have jurisdictional functions since they are allowed to 
 
Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence “must serve as a guide” for the interpretation 
of treaty law insofar as the Argentine state recognizes the Inter-American Court’s 
jurisdiction to adjudicate in all cases concerning the interpretation and application 
of the American Convention on Human Rights). 
 161. See Bradlow, supra note 54, at 410-11 (noting that MDBs report to the 
member-state authorities with decision making power). 
 162. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 34, art. 32(1) (“The jurisdiction 
of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which are referred to it as 
provided in Articles 33 [Inter-State cases], 34 [Individual applications] and 47 
[Advisory opinions].”). 
 163. For example, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights consists of seven 
judges. According to Article 4(1) of its Statute: “The Court shall consist of seven 
judges . . . elected in an individual capacity from among jurists of the highest 
moral authority and of recognized competence in the field of human rights, who 
possess the qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial functions 
under the law of the State of which they are nationals or of the State that proposes 
them as candidates.” OAS, Statue of Inter-American Court on Human Rights, art. 
4(1), O.A.S. Res. 448 (IX-0/79) (Oct. 1979). 
 164. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 100, art. 60 (“The judgment is final and 
without appeal.”). 
 165. This is the case with the ICJ’s decisions on legal disputes. Article 59 of the 
ICJ Statute provides that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Id. Thus, it would 
appear, the object of Article 59 is simply to prevent legal principles accepted by 
the Court in a particular case from being binding on other States or in other 
disputes. 
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process only requests submitted by project-affected individuals for 
the purpose of inspecting MDBs’ compliance with operational 
policies and procedures.166 Second, they do not consist of judges. 
Many of their current decision-makers are not attorneys, and they are 
not required to have a prior judicial experience in domestic 
jurisdictions.167 Finally, their decisions are neither final nor binding 
since their reports on submitted claims are meant to inform MDBs’ 
executive directors whether the MDBs have complied with 
operational policies.168 Thus, since these reports are not judgments 
themselves, they cannot be considered final or legally binding from a 
technical viewpoint. 
The inspection organ’s reports regarding complaints do not 
constitute case law concerning human rights. Some scholars believe 
that the “inspection mechanisms are slowly beginning to provide 
data and precedents that can influence the evolution of international 
human rights law.”169 Since the inspection organs are not 
international tribunals, their reports do not constitute judicial 
decisions—a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law 
according to the ICJ Statute170 (which lists all the sources of 
international law).171 Consequently, the reports in question can be 
regarded neither as authoritative evidence of the state of the law,172 
nor as judicial precedents concerning human rights. 
 
 166. See World Bank, Res. No. IBRD 93-10 (Resolution Establishing the 
Inspection Panel) ¶ 12, Sept. 22, 1993 [hereinafter World Bank Inspection Panel] 
(“The [Inspection] Panel shall receive requests for inspection presented to it by [a 
party] . . . affected by an action or omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of 
the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with respect to the 
design, appraisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank . . . .”). 
 167. For example, members of the World Bank Inspection Panel are required 
only to have certain independence of the World Bank’s Management, as well as 
knowledge on the World Bank’s operations. See id. ¶ 4. 
 168. This is the case of the World Bank Inspection Panel’s report. See id. ¶ 22 
(requiring that Panel reports address the Bank’s success in complying with its 
policies and procedures). 
 169. Bradlow, supra note 54, at 410. 
 170. See ICJ Statute, supra note 100, art. 38(1)(d) (allowing the Court to use 
judicial decisions as a secondary and additional interpretational source when 
hearing disputes that come before it). 
 171. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 5. 
 172. Id. at 19 (stressing that judicial decisions, the only “subsidiary” source of 
law mentioned in Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, are not even themselves a 
formal source of international law). That the ICJ Statute does not mention other 
CRIPPA_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  5:20 PM 
2010] MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 571 
These inspection organs do not make the final decisions on the 
issues addressed under their inspection function capacity. In fact, at 
the conclusion of their inspections, they submit only a written report 
with findings and recommendations to MDBs’ decision-makers 
regarding the financed-project under investigation. This is the case in 
the World Bank,173 IADB174 and IFC.175 Generally speaking, the 
Board of Directors and the President of the concerned MDB are the 
final decision-makers who decide whether and how to proceed with 
the MDB-financed project in question. 
There is no organ in charge of supervising the implementation of 
the decisions taken by the MDBs’ boards of directors, including the 
inspection organs in question. As a matter of fact, most of these 
inspection organs lack the authority to supervise the implementation 
of the decision-makers’ decisions or remedial actions on their 
submitted reports—only the IFC’s inspection organ has been given 
such power.176 Furthermore, the World Bank itself has expressly 
prohibited its inspection organ from monitoring action plans 
concerning implementation. According to the World Bank, “[t]he 
Board should not ask the [Inspection] Panel for its view on other 
aspects of the action plans nor would [sic] it ask the Panel to monitor 
the implementation of the action plans.”177 
1. The Right to an Effective Remedy 
The elements of the right to an effective remedy are critical factors 
to be considered when analyzing the ineffectiveness of MDBs’ 
inspection mechanisms from an international law point of view. In 
 
sources of “subsidiary” international law is telling. 
 173. See Bradlow, supra note 54, at 417 (stating that once the investigation is 
complete, the Inspection Panel submits its report to the Executive Directors and the 
President of the Bank). 
 174. See id. at 423 (stating that at the end of the investigation carried-out within 
the Independent Investigation Mechanism, the Panel submits its findings and 
recommendations in a written report to the Board of Executive Directors and to the 
President). 
 175. See id. at 436 (asserting that the findings of the Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman are presented to the President of the World Bank Group in a 
report). 
 176. Id. at 461. 
 177. World Bank, 1999 Clarification of the Board’s Second Review of the 
Inspection Panel, Recommendation 16 (Apr. 20, 1999). 
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particular, the elements should be considered when evaluating 
complaints that project-affected people file before investigative 
organs in order to assess whether those people are provided with 
prompt, judicial, and effective protection in cases involving human 
rights violations. The right to an effective remedy has at least two 
elements: (1) an effective and prompt remedy must exist, and (2) that 
remedy must meet the procedural requirements of due process of 
law. 
The right to an effective remedy is one of the most important 
rights recognized under international human rights law. Based on its 
indissoluble interconnection with the due process of law, the right to 
an effective remedy plays a critical role in assuring a prompt, 
judicial, and effective protection of substantial legal rights 
recognized in national constitutions and human rights treaties. As 
stated earlier, MDBs’ inspection mechanisms do not provide such 
protection. 
The main regional human rights treaties, such as the American 
Convention and the European Convention, recognize the right to an 
effective remedy as a fundamental right.178 Moreover, the right has 
been recognized so extensively and so frequently in international 
treaties and other instruments that it must be considered as customary 
international law. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which reflects customary law on human rights, states the 
right to an effective judicial remedy in Article 8.179 Similarly, the 
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which 
provides the most recent statement on the international law of the 
 
 178. See American Convention, supra note 34, art. 25 (providing that all persons 
have a right to “simple and prompt” or “any other effective” recourse for violation 
of other rights under the Convention, and obligating states to ensure that such 
recourse is made available within the legal framework of the state); European 
Convention, supra note 34, art. 13 (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity.”). 
 179. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 67, arts. 8, 10 
(stating that “[e]veryone has a right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law,” and that “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him”). 
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rights of indigenous peoples, includes a right to an effective judicial 
remedy in Article 40.180 The American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man also contains a provision on effective judicial 
remedies,181 and the Inter-American Court has determined that the 
American Declaration expresses the human rights obligations that all 
members of the OAS, including the United States, have assumed as 
parties to the OAS Charter.182 
The notion of the right to an effective remedy depends on the 
nature of the violation to be addressed by means of a legal claim. It 
refers to the adequacy and effectiveness of a remedy within a certain 
legal system. According to the Inter-American Court, “[a]dequate 
domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address an 
infringement of a legal right.”183 In addition, the Court opined that an 
effective remedy is a remedy “capable of producing the result for 
which it was designed.”184 Therefore, according to this notion, a 
remedy needs to be not only adequate but also effective at protecting 
legal rights. 
 
 180. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 127, 
art. 40 (granting to indigenous peoples the right to prompt and fair legal remedies, 
and providing further that legal processes take into account “the customs, 
traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and 
international human rights”). 
 181. See American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, arts. XXIV, 
XVIII (adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (March 
30 - May 2, 1948), OAS Res. 30, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V./I.4, rev. (1965)) 
(stating that “[e]very person has the right to submit respectful petitions to any 
competent authority, for reasons of either general or private interest, and the right 
to obtain a prompt decision thereon” and that “[e]very person may resort to the 
courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There should likewise be available to 
him a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of 
authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights”). 
 182. See Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Interpretation of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, 
¶¶ 35-45 (July 14, 1989); James Terry Roach & Jay Pinkerton v. United States, 
Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1986-1987 ¶¶ 46-49 (1987) (holding 
that the United States bound itself to OAS instruments on human rights); Rafael 
Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. United States, Case 9903, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
51/01 (2001) (holding a violation of articles I, II, XVIII, XXV of the American 
Declaration due to the detention of Cuban refugees). 
 183. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
4, ¶ 64 (July 29, 1988). 
 184. Id. ¶ 66. 
CRIPPA_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  5:20 PM 
574 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:531 
In addition, the remedy must provide a prompt judicial decision in 
addressing whether there was a violation of a legal right. According 
to the European Court, three factors should be considered when 
determining the reasonableness of the time required to carry out a 
proceeding: (1) the complexity of the case, (2) the procedural activity 
of the interested party, and (3) the conduct of the judicial 
authorities.185 The Inter-American Court has followed the same 
analysis,186 and determined that is necessary to do a comprehensive 
analysis of the entire proceedings before domestic courts as an 
overall assessment.187 
Procedural guarantees such as the ‘amparo’ and habeas corpus are 
considered prompt remedies, since they are meant to provide a 
judicial determination of the right at issue in a reasonable time and 
without unnecessary delays. According to the Inter-American Court, 
the amparo “is a simple and prompt remedy designed for the 
protection of all of the rights recognized by the constitutions and 
laws of the States Parties and by the Convention.”188 In this regard, 
habeas corpus (‘amparo of freedom’) is but one of its components 
and, as embodied in the Convention and in the legal systems of the 
States Parties, it functions as an independent remedy to protect the 
personal freedom of those who are being detained or who have been 
threatened with detention.189 
There is no consensus among regional human rights systems on 
whether the deciding body should be an actual court. As a matter of 
fact, while the American Convention requires the intervention of a 
“competent court or tribunal,”190 the European Convention only calls 
for a “national authority,” which does not necessarily mean a court or 
tribunal.191 But, the European Court stated that if independent 
 
 185. Vernillo v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 30 (1991); Motta v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R., 
¶ 16 (1991); Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R art. I, ¶¶ 30-54 (1993). 
 186. Genie Lacayo Case v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30, ¶ 77 
(Jan. 29, 1997). 
 187. Suárez-Rosero v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 35, ¶ 73 (Nov. 
12, 1997). 
 188. Advisory Opinion 8/87, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, ¶ 32 (Jan. 30, 1987). 
 189. Advisory Opinion 9/87, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶¶ 33-34 (Oct 6, 1987). 
 190. See American Convention, supra note 34, art. 25(2). 
 191. See European Convention, supra note 34, art. 13. 
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scrutiny of the claim need not be provided by a judicial authority, the 
national authority should be equipped with the “powers and 
guarantees” necessary to provide effective remedies to 
complainants.192 
Nevertheless, according to the governing principles in the Inter-
American System, the rights considered by virtue of the remedy must 
be subject to a final judicial determination. Article 25 of the 
American Convention is entitled “Right to Judicial Protection,” and 
clearly requires the intervention of a “competent court or tribunal for 
protection against acts that violate [peoples’] fundamental rights,” 
and further imposes upon states the duty “to develop the possibilities 
of judicial remedy.”193 Indeed, there is consistent case law that 
interconnects the right to an effective remedy with due process of 
law guarantees, based on the general obligation of States Parties to 
respect the rights protected by the Convention.194 
A remedy can become ineffective because of several related 
factors, including: procedural requirements; internal conditions 
prevailing in the country;195 a lack of reasoned decisions by the 
deciding body on the merits of the claim;196 a lack of independence 
of the deciding body;197 and a lack of a complete, serious, and 
impartial investigation of the acts.198 The Inter-American Court has 
 
 192. Chahal v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 152 (1996) (finding the 
remedies at issue ineffective where the national authority’s—the Home 
Secretary—decision could not be reviewed by another authority, only took into 
account risk and national security concerns, and failed to provide adequate 
procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel). 
 193. American Convention, supra note 34, art. 25. 
 194. See generally Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 189 (July 29, 1988); Fairen Garbi & Solís Corrales, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 2, ¶ 90 (June 26, 1987); Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 3, ¶ 93 (June 26, 1987). 
 195. See generally Velásquez-Rodríguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 80 
(determining that procedural requirements can make the remedy of habeas corpus 
ineffective, provided that it was powerless to compel the authorities, represented a 
danger to those who invoke it, and it was not impartially applied). 
 196. See Case of Carranza v. Argentina, Case 10.087, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 30/97, ¶ 73 (1997) (stating that the logic of every judicial remedy indicates 
that the deciding body must specifically establish the truth or error of the 
claimant’s allegation). 
 197. See Chahal, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 151-53. 
 198. See Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report No. 55/97, ¶ 243 (1997) (establishing that Argentina failed to carry out an 
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added other possibilities, for example: when practice has shown the 
ineffectiveness of a remedy; when judicial power lacks the necessary 
independence to render impartial decisions or the means to carry out 
its judgments; or in any other situation that constitutes a denial of 
justice, such as when there is an unjustified delay in the decision; or 
when, for any reason, the alleged victim is denied access to a judicial 
remedy.199 
In spite of its legal recognition and external factors, a remedy 
could be considered effective if it truly can establish if there was a 
violation of a legal right. The Inter-American Court stated that “for 
such a remedy to exist, it is not sufficient that it be provided for by 
the Constitution or by law or that it be formally recognized, but 
rather it must be truly effective in establishing whether there has 
been a violation of human rights and in providing redress.”200 In 
doing so, the Court emphasized the relevance of the element of 
effectiveness when considering if a certain remedy meets the 
applicable standards concerning the right to an effective remedy as 
set forth in the American Convention. 
Based on the above, according to well-established principles of 
international human rights law, the right to an effective remedy 
implies a prompt, judicial and effective remedy capable of 
adequately leading to the determination of the rights in question. 
CONCLUSION 
The international legal framework needs to address the fact that 
human rights violations are taking place in developing countries as a 
result of projects financed by MDBs. It is clear that MDBs do 
possess distinct legal personality and that they operate on the 
international and domestic planes by virtue of projects financed for 
borrowing countries. However, the existing rules on the law of 
responsibility render MDBs immune from liability for wrongful acts 
that result in human rights violations. These rules need to be adjusted 
to reflect the on-going complex violations of rights protected by 
international human rights law. 
 
immediate and exhaustive investigation in the place where the incident took place). 
 199. Advisory Opinion 9/87, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶¶ 34-41 (Oct 6, 1987). 
 200. Id. ¶ 24. 
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International human rights law must evolve according to the need 
for protection of minorities and vulnerable groups located in 
developing countries, especially indigenous peoples. Indeed, the 
human rights responsibility of MDBs is critical for the survival and 
well-being of indigenous peoples whose collective interests are 
affected by MDB-financed projects developed on their lands and 
territories. It is particularly true in respect of extractive industries 
projects, which are meant to explore and exploit the natural resources 
located on indigenous land.  
Finally, the existing gap under international law needs to be filled 
with new rules in order to govern the human rights responsibility of 
MDBs. In this regard, the different sources of international law can 
play a critical role in establishing new standards. Treaty rules can 
promptly lead to an agreeable solution of the issue at hand by the 
main actors: states and MDBs as international organizations. 
 
